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Abstract 
Due to the deleterious effect of the illicit transfer of funds on Africa economies the paper 
determines and compares the volume of illicit funds which should have been used for 
development but otherwise channeled into private benefits in seven African countries during 
2005-2015. Using the World Bank Residual Model, we found that illicit financial flows are 
being experienced in all the sample countries otherwise unabated. In quantum terms, illicit 
transfers of funds are more in upper-middle-income countries while and it was highest in 
low- income countries as a proportion of the country’s GDP. The study concluded that 
relative to aggregate income low-income countries engage more in illicit financial transfers 
that the other income groups whereas in quantum terms it was substantial in upper-middle-
income group. We recommend that all income groups should improve on regulatory controls 
in order cub illicit transfers in Africa, more importantly, the low-income group.   
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1.     Introduction 
The paper employs the World Bank Residual Model (WBRM) in determining the level of 
financial inflows and outflows for a sample of seven African countries in 2005-2015. In 
addition, the paper compares, which of the countries experienced the highest illicit funds 
transfer through financial flows as a proportion of the gross domestic product (GDP) of each 
country. The essence of the comparison is to determine whether illicit financial flows differ 
or exhibit common pattern by the level of individual’s country income.  
 
There are not many studies that have engaged in determining the level of illicit financial 
flows in Africa. The few that did so were able to provide an estimate of how much is lost to 
illicit financial flows on the aggregate and regional basis. Estimating individual country 
financial flows into illicit cover has been very scanty in the literature. Whereas, a knowledge 
of such a country-specific illicit financial flows would not only prima-facie provides an 
estimate of what is lost to illicit financial flows in each country it may inform the need for a 
new policy or policy revision to curb the illegal activities    
 
The concerns to minimize the increasing illicit financial flows around the world and in 
particular, Africa have been evolving in the literature over the last two decades. Movement of 
funds across borders is imperative for world economies to grow but the flow of “dirty 
money” out of Africa from evidence deny the continent of the essential financial sources for 
the funding of infrastructural needs such as education and health facilities among other basic 
needs. The economic benefits of increased movement of funds across the globe are 
numerous. It enhances greater, the level of economic activities, which have the tendency to 
improve world employment opportunities, global welfare, reduction in income inequality and 
world peace. However, the gains and losses in financial flows depend largely on net flows 
that are, the level of legal versus immoral fund movements, and the management of available 
funds in each economy. 
 
A study by Kar and Cartwright (2010) suggest that for about 39 years (1970-2008) after 
making some adjustments, the estimated monetary value of illicit financial outflows from 
developing countries may be about US$1.8 trillion while Ndikumana and Boyce (2010) 
found that about US$ 814 billion were illicitly transferred out of Africa within 40 years 
(1970-2010). Mevel, Siope and Karingi (2013) also found that US$409 billion passed through 
illicit financial flows in Africa based on trade mispricing method in one decade (2001-2010). 
A panel chaired by Thabo Mbeki (2015) found that in Africa, an average of about US$50 
million is lost annually due to illicit financial flows. In spite of the fact that these studies and 
the panel of enquiry chaired by Thabo Mbeki used different methods for estimating the illicit 
financial flows, the outcome of the respective studies appears to pass a similar verdict, which 
suggest that the quantum of illicit financial flows are quite high considering the low national 
incomes of most Sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries (AU/ECA 2015).     
 
The World Bank (2016) classification of countries by income affirms that just one country 
(Seychelles) out of 49 countries in the SSA attains the high-income status, 26 countries 
representing 53 per cent who are in the low-income bracket while 45 per cent are middle- 
income countries. The inability of many nations in the Sub Saharan Africa to move up the 
income ladder over time has been as a result of leakage in each country’s financial income 
such as the increasing illicit financing outflows engendered by high level of corruption, mis-
invoicing of services, trade mis-pricing, over-invoicing and under-invoicing (AU/ECA 2015).    
Consequently, the issue of illegal transfers of financial resources out of the continent is 




regarded as one of the major sources of substantial loss of resources that could have been 
used for developing the continent Kar and Cartwright (2010).  
 
The findings from earlier studies suggest that indeed net illicit financial flows are prevailing 
in Africa. Arising from this background, this study examines the same phenomenon with a 
sample comprising of Seychelles, Angola, South Africa, Cote d'Ivoire, Nigeria, Mali and 
Tanzania, which are selected respectively from four income groups as follows; high, upper 
middle income, lower middle income and low income. There is a need for the individual 
countries to be aware of how much is lost to illicit flows not only because of tracking such 
funds but to be able to recover same for public use.  
 
While an estimated aggregate of illicit financial flows out of Africa has been derived from 
some studies like Ndikumana and Boyce (2010), Kar and Cartwright (2010) and Thabo 
Mbeki Report (2015), the main motivation for this study, which is country specific, is to 
determine the volume of illicit financial flows of each country in the sample and also 
compare how countries dealing with this issue for policy. The bases for the selection of the 
sample are two-fold. First, is to find out the differences if any in the pattern of illicit financial 
flows amongst Anglophone, Francophone and Lusitania countries in Africa. Second, is to 
determine the value of illicit financial flows experienced by each country as a proportion of 
their level of income. We found that all the sample countries experienced illicit financial 
flows that deny them of substantial financial resources, which would have been used for 
improving the welfare of their people. This is particularly in the low-income and upper 
middle-income groups.  
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows; section two of the paper reviews the relevant 
literature, section three deals with the methodology while section four discusses the results 
and section five concludes the paper with policy recommendations.  
 
2.    Literature Review 
Kar and Catwright (2010), define illicit financial income as money that is obtained through 
extra-legal either by transfer or earnings without considering the type of transfer process. But 
Mevel, Siope and Karingi (2013) view that precise meaning and definition of illicit financial 
flow is scanty in the literature. This is partially due to, according to them, the controversy 
over how the “illicit” portion of the phenomenon and the “official” portion of financial flows 
are to be defined.  
 
A modest composition of the flows, according to United Nations Economic Commission for 
Africa (2012) revolves around the following sources: misappropriation of financial resources 
by government officials; income from drug and human trafficking, terrorism and related 
criminal activities and illegal activities of multinationals who engage in tax evasion and or 
avoidance from their legal operations in Africa nations. Based on the composition of sources 
of illicit financial flows by UNECA (2012), tracking the leakage in any country may be quite 
but not completely impossible. Furthermore, the Thabo Mbeki Report (2015) also observed 
that obtaining complete information on this phenomenon in Africa is almost futile due to the 
clandestine process of conducting the affairs. However, little information obtained by the 
panel suggest that large multilateral corporations are the biggest perpetrators of illicit 
financial flows out of Africa.    
 




The preoccupation of government is to capture official records of international trade and 
financial transactions through the Balance of Payments (BoP) accounts by each nation. In the 
process of capturing the BoP records, the problem of capturing invoice over-estimates and 
under-estimates by the appropriate government agency remains one of the challenges 
affecting the possibility of tracking illicit financial flows in Africa. On the other side of the 
coin are firms who evade tax payable to government and repatriate same out of the country of 
a domain through illegal means in order to avoid being caught or detected (AU/ECA 2015).   
In addition, the repatriation of illicit flows from drug trafficking and human trafficking also 
bypass the official process of the BoP records. Due to this shortcoming in maintaining proper 
BoP records, illicit financial flows do occur, in one form or the other, which include false 
invoicing and Hawala transactions (AU/ECA 2015).   
 
Illicit financial flow is dual, therefore, the inflow of illicit funds and outflows do occur and 
the difference between the flows represents the net position. Unfortunately, Kar and 
Catwright (2010) argue that netting the inflows from the outflow does not represent a net 
benefit to the nation even if the inflows are greater than the outflows. The argument is based 
on the fact that positive net inflows are not recorded in the official records of BoP; such 
inflows are neither taxed nor used for productive purposes. In view of this rational argument, 
this paper will emphasize the absolute position of illicit financial flows of individual 
countries as a proportion of GDP for comparison.   
 
In spite of the declining level of income in the continent, illicit financial flows are still 
increasing otherwise unabated by the sampled countries (Thabo Mbeki Report, 2015). This 
culminates in the loss of financial resources for development as pointed out by Kar and 
Cartwright (2010). The pattern of illicit financial flows in the different categories of income 
level relative to the gross domestic product (GDP) is relatively unknown for individual 
countries but the regional grouping by Ndikumana and Boyce (2010) found that in the period 
1970-2004 illicit financial flows is about 82% of the regional GDP. The findings from earlier 
studies, justify a more in-depth study so as to determine the proportion of illicit financial 
flows relative to the income level of individual nations and how vulnerable, in each country 
considering the proportion of income lost to illicit financial flows.  
 
Prior studies on this phenomenon, have not only awakened the fact that financial resources 
that should have been used for improving the domestic economy in the area of infrastructural 
development, health, education as well as the improvement of good living standards for the 
African nations, escape outside the nations through illegal processes. Regrettably, illicit 
financial flows into the domestic economy may also be used to fuel the insurgency and 
negative activities such as terrorism, radicalism and human trafficking to mention a few. How 
these degenerate activities in Africa by citizens of the continent and their foreign 
collaborators affect different income levels in Africa is important for policy formulation and 
revision.  
 
There are four (Hot Money Method, Dooley Method, World Bank Residual Method and 
Trade Mispricing Method) methods of estimating illicit financial flows in the literature 
UNECA (2012). Kar and Catwright (2010) discuss two of the methods while Mevel, Siope 
and Karingi (2010) explain the four channels, which included the two that is contained in 
Karand Catwright (2010). However, the two studies explain that the IMF Direction of Trade 
and Statistics (DOTS) and used trade mis-invoicing method by assuming that the difference 
in case of imports between actual cost of such invoice and the increased adjustment of the 




invoice price and in case of export a reduction in the invoiced prices of import and actual 
invoiced prices enhances the outflow of illicit funds out of a country. A comparison of the 
prices of the country’s trade relationship in some bilateral international trade and the world 
price of such trade represents the mis-invoiced estimate having adjusted for insurance and 
freight. Kar and Catwright (2010) explain that the World Bank residual model depends on the 
use of Balance of Payments (BoP) accounts for determining the quantum of Illicit financial 
flows experienced by a nation on annual basis. It was observed by UNECA (2012) that the 
disparity between the estimates from the two methods is marginal. This implies that the use 
of either of the two methods suffices.     
 
The model considers the source of funds by a nation and the uses of such funds in 
determining illicit financial flows in and out of a country. The difference between the two 
(sources minus uses) sources if positive, represents illicit financial outflow and if negative, it 
means illicit financial inflow. List of items recorded in the source column is the annual 
change in the stock of external debts contracted by the public sector and the net inflow of 
foreign direct investment. The uses of funds include financing the net current account deficit 
of the BoP and foreign reserves. In cases where a country’s sources of funds are greater than 
the use of such funds this represents illicit funds inflow into the country and vice-versa. The 
review of literature affirms the aggregate some estimates of illicit financial flows experienced 
in Africa but as far we know, individual African country’s illicit financial flows have not 
been relatively investigated. Using a sample of some African countries, this is the gap this 
study tries to fill.   
 
3. Methodology  
This paper adapts the World Bank Residual Model but instead of using the net current 
account deficit of the BoP used by Kar and Catwright (2010), the net financial account 
balance (NFAB) was considered for the derivation of use of funds. The NFAB measures how 
net lending to or borrowing from non-residents is financed. This is conceptually equal to the 
sum of balances on the current and capital account (World Bank 2015). In view of the fact 
that the net position on current and capital account as well as how net lending to or borrowing 
from non-residents are being funded are inclusive in NFAB, the use of net final flow is 
considered in this study.  
 
Out of the four methods for estimating illicit financial flows mentioned under literature 
review, the World Bank Residual Model and the Trade Mispricing Method are more popular 
for the estimation of this type of phenomenon (UNECA (2012).  Given the fact that the two 
methods are both conservative they are able to accommodate multiple channels of illicit 
financial flows and data compilation error from the original sources. Furthermore, they have 
both been used by earlier studies as mentioned with negligible difference in the estimates 
(UNECA 2012).  Due to these limitations but accommodating stance, the paper adopts the 
World Bank Residual approach for the empirical analysis  
 
3.1 Country Sample Frame and Modality 
The sample for this study covers the four income groups as prescribed by the World Bank for 
the period 2005-2015. The lists of nations used as the sample are Seychelles (high-income 
nation); Angola and South Africa (upper middy-income); Cote d'Ivoire and Nigeria (lower 
middle-income) and Mali and Tanzania (low-income). Seychelles is included in the sample 
being the only high-income country in SSA World Bank ranking in 2016. South Africa and 
Nigeria were included due to the size of the economies while Cote d'Ivoire, Angola, Tanzania 




and Mali are included based on data availability within the constraint of our choice stratum. 
Suffice to mention that many African countries data for this type of study were either not 
available for the full or partial period of the study. This is a major constraint in the selection 
of the sample by strata. Otherwise, the selection of study sample would have been based on 
simple random sampling which gives every member of SSA within a stratum the chance of 
being selected.    
  
3.2 Data and Data Sources 
In respect of the seven countries the data span cover 2005-2015 for five of them but Cote 
d’Ivoire and Mali data span are for 2005-2013 and 2005-2014 due to non-availability of data 
for uses of funds. The figures are expressed in the current US Dollars. The data are divided 
into two classifications based on the World Bank Residual Model. The first group comprised 
of the sources of funds that includes the country’s external public debts stocks and publicly 
guaranteed external debts and the net inflow of foreign direct investment. The time series 
data for public debts are obtained from World Bank International Debts Statistics through the 
World Bank Development indicators and net inflow of direct investment are obtained from 
the International Monetary Fund – Balance of Payments database supplemented by data 
obtained from the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and 
Official National Statistics. Data on Financial Openness is defined as the Foreign Direct 
Investment Net Inflow as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP). The data is 
obtained from the World Bank – World Development Indicators database.  
 
The second group is made up of the use of funds as follows; net financial account balance 
and reserve assets. The net financial account balance is conceptually equal to the sum of 
balances on current and capital account. The data is obtained from the World Bank 
Development Indicators data files. Finally, the reserve assets data are obtained from 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) 6th edition of the Balance of Payments IMF data 
warehouse. The country’s GDP considered for this paper is at purchasers’ prices made of the 
gross value added by all residents’ producers in the economy plus any product taxes and less 
any subsidies that are not included in the value of the products. The estimation is made 
without making deductions for depreciation and fabricated assets or depletion and 
degradation of natural resource (World Bank 2015).   
 
4 Discussions of Results 
4.1 High Income Country 
Table 1, contains the sources of funds and uses of funds for Seychelles, the only high-income 
country in SSA in 2016.  In the sources of funds rows, debt obtained by the public sector for 
the country is blank because, available information in the World Bank development indicator 
database does not contain any information about the public sector debts for the country. The 
only source of funds for the country is from the net foreign direct investments while the uses 
of funds are the net financial account balance and foreign reserves. In addition, the Table 
contains the gross domestic product (GDP) and the proportion of financial illicit flows 
(outflow/inflow) as a percentage of GDP.  
 
In absolute terms, the Table indicates the least illicit financial outflow experienced by the 
country during the period of the study as US$ 39004 in 2009 and the highest was US$ 
876473 in 2013 while the highest illicit financial inflow was US$ 182467 in 2015. The total 
illicit financial outflow experienced by the country was US$ 3,322,280 while illicit financial 
inflow was US$ 239323 as indicated in Table 8. 




In Table 1, approximately 22.11% of the GDP passed through illicit financial outflows in 
2005and this increased to 32.16% in 2007. The highest illicit financial outflow as a 
percentage of GDP was in 2012 with a value of 69.15%. In the following year (2013) the 
illicit financial outflows reduced to 18.12% as a proportion of the GDP. This may be due to a 
reduction of about 6.67% in the net inflow of FDI into the country between 2012 and 2013. 
Generally, the country experienced a higher proportion of illicit money through illicit funds 
outflow compared to inflows.  
 
On the aggregate, the country experienced US$ 3,3222,80 through outflows of illicit money 
and an outflow of US$ 239,323 in the period of the study. These transfers of illicit money 
represent an average of 28.07% of the country’s GDP in absolute terms and a net financial 
flow of 24.70% as a proportion of GDP respectively. The evidence from the data confirms 
that although there is no uniform trend in the pattern of illicit financial outflows it is greater 
than the inflow in Seychelles for the period of the study.    
 
The fluctuations in the pattern of illicit financial flows in Seychelles during the period of the 
study may be due to the changes in the level of financial openness of the country. Table 1 
indicates that in periods when net inflows of FDI rise, illicit financial outflows also increase. 
For example, 2012 and 2013 the net inflow of FDI was the highest and illicit financial 
outflow for the two periods are also relatively high compared to 2007 and 2008 and other 
years. The implication of this evidence is that the government of the country must put in 
place an increased monitoring process on import/export, inflow/outflow of funds for 
investment and money laundering operations in order to curb illicit financial flows in the 
country.   
 
The average annual GDP of Seychelles for the period of the study was about US$ 1 billion 
and about 25% of it was assumed to have been illicitly transferred out of the country. This is 
relatively high in spite of the fact that Seychelles is a high-income country. Sequel to the 
period of the study, the real GDP of the country dropped from 5.7% in 2015 to 4.8% in 2016 
(African Economic Outlook 2017).  
 
4.2 Upper middle-Income Countries 
Unlike Seychelles, the two upper middle-income countries (Angola and South Africa) have 
public debts as indicated in Tables 2 and 3. The details of the illicit financial flows for these 
countries are also contained in the same Tables. The two countries experienced both illicit 
outflow and inflow into their respective countries during the period of the study. In the case 
of Angola, the illicit financial outflow was experienced in 2009, 2014 and 2015 for 
US$15,256,572, US$13,762,294 and US$21,775,170 respectively (Table 2). 
 
In the case of South Africa, in Table 3, illicit financial outflows were relatively higher 
compared to Angola. Evidence from South Africa affirms that illicit financial outflows 
occurred in 2005-2014 except 2015 in which the country experienced illicit funds inflow. 
During the period of the study, the highest illicit funds outflow from South Africa was 
US$39,179,944 in 2012 followed by US$21,364,724 and US$21,338,912 in 2010 and 2007 
respectively.  
 
The pattern of illicit financial flows in each year in Angola as reported in Table 2 shows that 
inflow of funds is relatively more than outflows. Whereas, as indicated in Table 3, for South 
Africa illicit financial outflows are more than inflows in each year. This evidence suggests 




that at least, there is a flow back effect of illicit funds in Angola compared to South Africa. 
The Inflow of illicit funds to Angola (Table 2) shows that in 2005 it was (US$6,340,349) 
thereafter it continues to increase and by 2011 it has reached (US$22,761,802). However, by 
2013 it reduced to (US$11,555,470). In 2014 and 2015 the country experienced a higher 
illicit financial outflow of US$13,762,294 and US$ 21,775,170 respectively.  
 
In the case of South Africa (Table 3) illicit funds outflow was fluctuating in 2005-2014. It 
was US$ 9,978,535 in 2005 and by 2012 it was US$ 39,179,944 representing the highest 
outflow in the entire period of the study. The outflow dropped in 2013 and 2014; incidentally, 
the only inflow of illicit funds was experienced in 2015. As indicated in Table 3, the country 
experienced substantial illicit outflow in 2012 when public debts were the highest and net 
inflow of FDI was not relatively high. Perhaps this is a signal for misappropriations of public 
financial resources through the illicit transfer of borrowed funds which might have been used 
for developmental purposes.  
 
The summary of illicit financial flows is reported in Table 8 for all the countries. As indicated 
in the Table, the average illicit financial flows into Angola as a proportion of GDP was 
17.75% while that of South Africa was 5.58%. In quantum terms, the illicit financial outflow 
was substantially high in South Africa totalling US$196,335,868, the total inflow was 
substantially high in Angola for US$ 104,738,541 while inflows were relatively lower for 
South Africa compared to Angola. The flow back of illicit financial flows in Angola is higher 
than South Africa although the financial resources may not be available for public use due to 
its illicit nature the illicit outflow experienced in South Africa are not of any benefit for both 
the public and private sector. The results of the upper middle-income countries suggest that 
both countries exhibit a different pattern of illicit financial flows. Angola was relatively 
higher than South Africa in absolute terms, estimating illicit financial flows as a proportion of 
their respective country’s GDP. But in quantum terms, illicit outflow is higher in South 
Africa while inflow is higher in Angola. 
 
The governments of the two countries need to improve on the financial regulatory measures 
to curb illicit financial flows. Although, the increase in the real GDP of South Africa was 
1.3% in 2015 but it declined to 0.6% in 2016 and rose to 1.3% in 2017 (South African 
National Treasury), Angola real growth rate was 0.10% in 2016 and dropped to (2.5%) in 
2017 (African Development Bank 2017). In the upper middle-income group, in spite of the 
declining real GDP growth rate, illicit financial flows to GDP were high in quantum terms 
and in comparison to the GDP growth rate. It can be inferred that resources, which should 
have been used for developmental purposes are lost to illicit financial outflows.  
 
4.3 Lower Middle Income Countries  
Tables 4 and 5 contain the records of illicit financial flows of lower middle-income countries 
comprising of Cote d’Ivoire and Nigeria respectively. Both countries experienced both inflow 
and outflow of illicit funds in different years and for different amounts. However, Nigeria 
experienced a more substantial amount of illicit financial flows compared to Cote d’Ivoire. 
This may be partially due to the size of the economy and for lack of data for 2014-15 (uses of 
funds) in the case of Cote d’Ivoire. Cote d’Ivoire experienced the highest illicit outflow in 
2013 and the least in 2006 for US$ 1,663,119 and US$ 733,553 respectively. The illicit 
financial outflow was a negative of (US$ 11,806,936) in 2012 and in 2005 it was (US$ 
806,360). 




In Nigeria (Table 5) data span is complete the highest illicit financial outflow was US$ 
31,898,218 in 2009 followed by 2014 for US$ 26,073,791 while the least outflow was 
recorded in 2011 for US$ 4,377,217. The inflow of the illicit funds was highest in 2005 with 
a negative of (US$ 45,175, 610) thereafter it declined slightly in 2006 but substantially in 
2007, 2008, and 2010 representing (US$ 41, 486, 916), (US$7,426,114), (US$ 1,534,436) 
and (US$ 1,164,043) respectively.  
 
The aggregate illicit financial inflows and outflows of money for the two countries are as 
shown in Table 8. The aggregate illicit outflow of money for Nigeria was US$87,739,590 and 
inflow was US$114,410,096 representing an average of about 9.77% as a proportion of the 
GDP in absolute terms. The net illicit financial flow as a proportion of the GDP was (4.37%). 
In case of Cote d’Ivoire, the aggregate illicit inflow of money was US$5,453,123 while the 
outflow of illicit financial flows was US$21,744,347. This represents an average of 9.65% of 
the absolute illicit financial flows as a proportion of GDP and (5.80%) of net inflow as a 
proportion GDP.  The results of the lower middle-income countries suggest that both 
countries have a relatively close proportion of absolute illicit financial flows as a proportion 
of their respective country’s GDP. But in quantum terms, the amount of illicit financial flows 
in Nigeria was substantially higher than Cote d’Ivoire for both the inflows and outflows Cote 
d'Ivoire GDP annual growth rate was 9.16% in 2015 and it dropped to 8.77% in 2016 
showing a decline of 0.39% (World Bank 2017).  In case of Nigeria, the GDP growth rate 
dropped to a negative of -1.6% in 2016 but the country is expected to return to the positive 
growth rate of about 2.2% in 2017 (African Economic Outlook 2017). The two lower middle-
income countries experienced a high inflow of illicit financial inflows but their GDP still 
dropped with Nigeria experiencing a negative real economic growth rate in 2016.    
 
4.4 Low-Income countries 
The data of the two income countries considered in this paper are contained in Tables 6 and 
7. Mali experienced illicit financial outflows flows in all the years during the period of the 
study except for 2006. The highest outflow occurred in 2010 and the least was in 2005 for 
US$ 1,676,696 and US$259,926 respectively. The only illicit financial outflows experienced 
by the country in the period of the study occurred in 2006 for (US$ 349,035), as indicated in 
Table 6.   
 
In Tanzania, financial illicit outflows also occurred every year just like Mali except for 2006 
when an inflow of (US$8,082,969) was experienced by the country. The financial inflow 
experienced by Tanzania was substantially higher than that of Mali incidentally, in the same 
year. The highest illicit financial outflows in Tanzania was in 2013 and the least was in 2007 
for US$7,712,241 and US$1,774,782 respectively.  
 
In Table 8, the average proportion of illicit financial flows to GDP in absolute terms for the 
period of the study was 11.41% and 17.02% for Mali and Tanzania respectively while the 
average net illicit financial flow was 2.59% and 9.20% for Mali and Tanzania respectively. 
The inference from the results of this group is that outflow of illicit funds flow was greater 
the inflow for the two countries but Tanzania was higher than Mali. The outflow of illicit 
money is suggestive of the fact that no benefit is derived by both the private and public 
sector. 
 
In Tanzania, real GDP growth rate was estimated at 7.2% and the same position was 
projected for 2017 (African Economic Outlook 2017). In case of Mali, the economic growth 




rate was 5.3% in 2016 and this is expected to be maintained in 2017 due to consistent 
domestic demand in the country (African Development bank 2017).    
 
4.5 Aggregate illicit financial outflows by country 
Chart 1, shows the aggregate illicit total financial outflows for each country across the 
income level in the period 2005-2015.The chart is derived from the summary of the 
individual country indicated in Table 8 column 3. Out of a total illicit financial outflow of 
US$ 401,762,657 Million in the period of the study, South Africa experienced the highest 
outflow of 49% followed by Nigeria 22% and third is Angola with 13%. Closely following is 
Tanzania 12% while Mali came fifth with 2% and Seychelles and Cote d'Ivoire were even at 
1% respectively. 
 
The high share of illicit outflows by South Africa and Nigeria may be partly related to the 
size of net inflow of FDI into the two countries. In the period of the study, South Africa as an 
emerging economy has a relatively higher net inflow of FDI and by extension, the level of 
business activities by foreign firms may be higher. Activities of illicit financial flows due to 
tax avoidance and or money laundry may be more prevalent in both Nigeria and South Africa 
compared to other countries in the sample. This assumption is further buttressed by the fact 
that South Africa and Nigeria though are of different income group share illicit financial 
flows of the sample of the study while the other five countries shared 28%.  
 
In terms of income category, the upper middle income had the highest illicit financial outflow 
of 62% followed by the lower middle income comprising of Nigeria and Cote d'Ivoire, which 
shared 23% while Mali and Tanzania came third with 14% and Seychelles is last with1%. 
This in spite of the fact that Seychelles level of financial openness is the highest though not 
the biggest recipient of net FDI among the countries, it has the least illicit financial flows 
among the countries. In terms of financial openness, Tanzania came second but the level of 
illicit financial flows is still relatively smaller compared to South Africa and Nigeria whose 
illicit financial flows are high with low financial openness (See Tables 1-7 for the analysis of 
financial openness of each country as defined by the UNCTAD de facto measure of financial 
openness 
 
4.6 Aggregate illicit financial inflows by country 
Chart 2 indicates the level of illicit financial inflows. That chart is derived from column 4 of 
Table 8. It shows that out of a total illicit financial outflow of US$259,023,243 million by the 
sample countries, the pattern of each country’s contribution to the illicit financial inflows 
differs compared to the illicit outflows. Under this circumstance, in the period 2005-2015, 
inflow into Nigeria was 44% of the total financial illicit inflows for the sample countries 
followed by Angola with 41% and third in rank is Cote d'Ivoire at 8%. The two countries in 
the lower middle-income level in West Africa (Nigeria and Cote d'Ivoire) share 52% of the 
total illicit financial inflows in the period of the study.  
 
The second in rank is Angola that shares 41% of the total illicit financial inflow for the 
sample countries while South Africa is fourth with 3% of the total illicit financial inflows. 
The upper-income level countries share 44% of illicit financial inflow with Angola in the 
substantial lead and a marginal contribution of 3% by South Africa.   Seychelles is the least in 
this category followed by Mali and Tanzania who shares 1% and 3% respectively.  
 
 




4.7 Summary of Comparative Analysis 
The summary of the comparative analysis in Table 9 indicates that Seychelles, as a high- 
income country experienced a relatively low amount of illicit financial flows compared to 
other countries in the sample. However, comparing illicit absolute financial flows as a 
proportion of GDP, it came second with 28.07% illicit financial flows.      
 
In the same Table, the upper middle-income category, exhibit different patterns of illicit 
financial flows. South Africa was relatively higher than Angola in quantum terms but 62% of 
total illicit financial outflows occurred in this income group and 44% for illicit financial 
inflow. In absolute terms, the income group came third with 23.33% representing the 
proportion of illicit financial flows to the GDP 
 
The results of the lower middle-income countries as indicated in Table 8 suggest that both 
countries have a relatively close proportion of absolute illicit financial flows as a proportion 
of their respective country’s GDP as they account for 19.42%, which made them the fourth in 
the rank of income group. But in quantum terms, the amount of illicit financial outflows of 
the two countries is 52% financial illicit inflow and 23% outflow however, Nigeria’s 
experience was substantially higher than Cote d’Ivoire for both the inflows and outflows 
(Table 9).  
 
The results of the low-income group indicate that outflow of illicit funds was relatively 
greater than others inflow for the two countries but Tanzania was higher than Mali. The 
estimation of absolute illicit outflow as a proportion of the GDP of the two low-income 
countries was the highest at 28.43% in the period of the study.  
 
5.0 Conclusion and Recommendations   
The paper employs the World Bank Residual Model for determining the level of illicit 
financial flows in a sample of seven countries in SSA. Evidence from the study shows that 
illicit financial flows prevail in all the countries in the sample unabated. The economic 
implications of this phenomenon are that the perpetuation of financial illicit flows affects 
negatively the country’s potential to improve their national income. Due to loss of such 
financial resources to illicit transfers out of the country.  
 
It has been widely discussed in public official circles, that illicit financial transfers most often 
result into the reduction of public investment as well as private investment for the benefit of 
the people. What the government losses in from tax income, money laundering and some 
other clandestine transfers implies the possibility of a decline in education infrastructure, 
provision of basic learning materials, scholarship for gifted and brilliant indigent students. 
Such illicit outflows also affect the provision of other public goods like health facilities, 
improvement and maintenance of road network as well as multiplication of social problems if 
the level of unemployment continues to increase.        
 
Based on the sample, this study has been able to establish that in quantum terms, upper 
middle income experienced the highest amount (US$) of illicit financial flows followed by 
lower middle-income while the least was Seychelles as the only high-income country in SSA. 
In terms of the proportion of illicit financial flows to GDP our findings reveal a different 
hierarchy amongst the income groups. Based on absolute estimates of illicit financial flows to 
the GDP low-income countries was in the lead followed by high-income while upper middle- 
and lower middle-income groups came third and fourth respectively  




Based on the sample, the paper concluded that low-income countries experienced the highest 
absolute illicit financial outflow as a proportion of GDP while in quantum terms upper 
middle-income countries experienced the highest amount (US$) of illicit financial outflows. 
The inference from this finding is that in spite of the low level of income of some SSA 
countries illicit financial transfer may still be highly prevalent at a level which may be 
relatively worse than what is being experienced in the supposedly other higher rank income 
groups in SSA.  
 
The unabatingly experience of SSA countries of outflow/inflow of illicit money has negative 
implications as mentioned earlier. Therefore, the following policy recommendations are 
desirable in curbing illicit financial flows in the countries considered in this paper as well as 
other countries in Africa. The checking of the value of import and export of firms through a 
multiple agencies set up through private and public sector participation apart from port (sea 
or air) process may be entrenched in the process validating import/export invoices.  
 
SSA countries should consider the establishment of regulatory agencies that will be 
responsible for monitoring the business activities of multinationals in order to minimize tax 
evasion that may be illegally transferred out of the country. The banking system is always 
reluctant to the disclosure of financial crimes due to their duty of secrecy. In other to 
overcome this huddle, enabling laws should be made to liberalize the process of reporting 
financial crimes suspected by banks in the interest of the public. 
 
The process of doing business in most SSA countries do not conform to international best 
practices in view of this those countries that are lacking in this area should step-up and design 
a more efficient process of trailing financial transactions so as to track down in good time any 
of such financial deals that are considered illegal or suspicious. Fiscal transparency should be 
adopted by all SSA countries as a means of reducing corruption and eventual curtailment of 
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Table 1: High Income (Seychelles) 
 
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Sources of funds:                       
Debt obtained by public sector     n.a          n.a          n.a                n.a             n.a              n.a               n.a      n.a        n.a            n.a 
            
n.a 
Net inflow of FDI  80729 140556 175928 179825 168252 159795 143241 613208 572289 108307 105894 
Total sources (A) 80729 140556 175928 179825 168252 159795 143241 613208 572289 108307 105894 
Uses of funds:                        
Net financial account balance -144472 -118923 -156509 -178922 -3552 135551 -150464 -198988 -400584 -191931 215761 
Foreign reserves 22000 n.a  n.a  46800 132800 81100 36000 27900 96400 42500 72600 
Total uses (B) -122472 -118923 -156509 -132122 129248 216651 -114464 -171088 -304184 -149431 288361 
(A) - (B) 203201 259479 332437 311947 39004 -56856 257705 784296 876473 257738 -182467 
Illicit cash outflow 203201 259479 332437 311947 39004   257705 784296 876473 257738   
Illicit cash inflow           -56856         -182467 
GDP 919103 1016418 1033561 967200 847397 969936 1065826 1134267 1411061 1422530 1437722 
illicit cash flow  (% of GDP)  22.11 25.53 32.16 32.25 4.60 -5.86 24.18 69.15 62.11 18.12 -12.69 
Financial Openness is the FDI Net 
Inflow (% of GDP)  8.78 13.83 17.02 18.59 19.86 16.47 13.44 54.06 4.06 7.61 7.37 
Note: Figures are in Current US$  
Sources: World Bank Development Indicator; IMF 6th Edition Country BOP country Data 










Table 2: Upper Middle Income (Angola) 
  2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Sources of funds:                       
Debt obtained by public sector  1351951 -2170385 1883012 3459794 944259 1831442 2058495 1678226 4146622 4476982 -522710 
Net inflow of FDI -1303837 -37715 -893342 1678971 2205298 -3227211 -3023770 -6897954 -7120017 1921670 9282167 
Total sources (A) 48114 -2208100 989670 5138765 3149557 -1395769 -965275 -5219728 -2973395 6398652 8759457 
Uses of funds:                        
Net financial account balance 4571463 10957772 8947428 5971223 -7103015 7746598 13072527 11408737 8804075 -3433642 -9956713 
Foreign reserves 1817000       -          - 6673000 -5004000 5569000 8724000 4112000 -222000 -3930000 -3059000 
Total uses (B) 6388463 10957772 8947428 12644223 -12107015 13315598 21796527 15520737 8582075 -7363642 -13015713 
(A) - (B) -6340349 -13165872 -7957758 -7505458 15256572 -14711367 -22761802 -20740465 -11555470 13762294 21775170 
Illicit cash outflow         15256572         13762294 21775170 
Illicit cash inflow -6340349 -13165872 -7957758 -7505458   -14711367 -22761802 -20740465 -11555470         -        - 
GDP 28233713 41789479 60448921 84178033 75492385 82470913 104115923 115398371 124912063 126776874 102626929 
illicit cash flow (% of GDP) -22.46 -31.51 -13.16 -8.92 20.21 -17.84 -21.86 -17.97 -9.25 10.86 21.22 
Financial Openness is the FDI Net 
Inflow (% of GDP) -4.62 -0.09 -1.48 1.99 2.92 -3.91 -2.90 -5.98 -5.70 1.52 9.04 
Note: Figures are in Current US$  










Table 3: Upper Middle Income (South Africa) 
  2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Sources of funds: 
           
Debt obtained by public sector  2,395,938 -200,565 -1,071,184 -191,594 3,035,535 13,958,949 5,277,205 14,950,802 -1,915,959 2,055,716 956,090 
Net inflow of FDI  6,522,098 623,292 6,586,792 9,885,001 7,624,490 3,693,272 4,139,289 4,626,029 8,232,519 5,791,659 1,521,140 
Total sources (A) 8,918,036 422,727 5,515,608 9,693,407 10,660,025 17,652,221 9,416,494 19,576,831 6,316,560 7,847,375 2,477,230 
Uses of funds:  
           
Net financial account balance -6,826,499 -12,432,250 -15,823,304 -9,770,188 -14,376,174 -7,508,503 -9,052,229 -20,801,113 -13,571,579 -13,917,745 11,645,523 
Foreign reserves 5,766,000 
  
2,226,000 4,171,000 3,796,000 4,709,000 1,198,000 499,000 1,399,000 -757,000 
Total uses (B) -1,060,499 -12,432,250 -15,823,304 -7,544,188 -10,205,174 -3,712,503 -4,343,229 -19,603,113 -13,072,579 -12,518,745 10,888,523 
(A) - (B) 9,978,535 12,854,977 21,338,912 17,237,595 20,865,199 21,364,724 13,759,723 39,179,944 19,389,139 20,366,120 -8,411,293 
Illicit cash outflow 9,978,535 12,854,977 21,338,912 17,237,595 20,865,199 21,364,724 13,759,723 39,179,944 19,389,139 20,366,120 
 
Illicit cash inflow 
          
-8,411,293 
GDP 257,772,766 271,638,630 299,415,359 286,769,850 295,936,471 375,349,396 416,418,862 396,342,265 367,593,603 351,304,929 314,571,945 
illicit cash flow  (% of  GDP) 3.87 4.73 7.13 6.01 7.05 5.69 3.30 9.89 5.27 5.80 -2.67 
Financial Openness is the FDI Net 
Inflow (% of GDP) 1.05 2.17 2.18 3.76 2.38 1.55 1.79 1.21 1.42 1.56 1.85 
Note: Figures are in Current US$ 











Table 4: Lower Middle Income (Cote d’Ivoire) 
 
  2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Sources of funds: 
           
Debt obtained by public sector  -1,116,613 857,252 823,957 -1,019,007 2,087,021 -3,313,112 483,100 -4,875,817 1,230,889 181,243 728,160 
Net inflow of FDI  348,921 350,653 443,216 466,490 396,031 358,119 301,577 330,274 407,476 438,773 430,158 
Total sources (A) -767,692 1,207,905 1,267,173 -552,517 2,483,052 -2,954,993 784,677 -4,545,543 1,638,365 620,016 1,158,318 
Uses of funds:  
           
Net financial account balance 186,668 474,352 -10,944 497,005 1,805,541 1,617,929 2,772,795 7,714,393 -156,754 
  
Foreign reserves -148,000 
  
-136,000 915,000 566,000 853,000 -453,000 132,000 
  
Total uses (B) 38,668 474,352 -10,944 361,005 2,720,541 2,183,929 3,625,795 7,261,393 -24,754 0 0 
(A) - (B) -806,360 733,553 1,278,117 -913,522 -237,489 -5,138,922 -2,841,118 -11,806,936 1,663,119 620,016 1,158,318 
Illicit cash outflow 
 
733,553 1,278,117 
     
1,663,119 620,016 1,158,318 
Illicit cash inflow -806,360 
  
-913,522 -237,489 -5,138,922 -2,841,118 -11,806,936 
   
GDP 17,084,929 17,800,887 20,343,635 24,224,903 24,277,494 24,884,505 25,381,617 27,040,562 31,264,187 34,217,693 31,759,249 
illicit cash flow (% of GDP) -4.72 4.12 6.28 -3.77 -0.98 -20.65 -11.19 -43.66 5.32 1.81 3.65 
Financial Openness is the FDI Net 
Inflow (% of GDP) 2.04 1.97 2.18 1.93 1.63 1.44 1.19 1.22 1.30 1.24 1.49 
Note: Figures are in Current US$  








Table 5: Lower Middle Income (Nigeria) 
  2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Sources of funds:                     
 
Debt obtained by public sector  -12,302,079 -16,419,217 -214,519 287,380 319,472 469,689 1,245,602 743,348 1,606,361 847,121 1,499,196 
Net inflow of FDI  4,982,534 4,854,417 6,034,971 8,196,607 8,554,841 6,026,232 8,841,113 7,069,934 5,562,874 4,655,849 3,128,592 
Total sources (A) -7,319,545 -11,564,800 5,820,452 8,483,987 8,874,313 6,495,921 10,086,715 7,813,282 7,169,235 5,502,970 4,627,788 
Uses of funds:                      
 
Net financial account balance 26,520,065 29,922,116 13,246,566 8,370,423 -12,508,905 -2,033,036 5,403,598 12,375,898 -7,685,845 -12,186,821 1,049,524 
Foreign reserves 11,336,000     1,657,000 -10,515,000 9,693,000 305,900 11,099,000 -980,000 -8,384,000 -5,977,000 
Total uses (B) 37,856,065 29,922,116 13,246,566 10,027,423 -23,023,905 7,659,964 5,709,498 23,474,898 -8,665,845 -20,570,821 -4,927,476 
(A) - (B) -45,175,610 -41,486,916 -7,426,114 -1,543,436 31,898,218 -1,164,043 4,377,217 -15,661,616 15,835,080 26,073,791 9,555,264 
Illicit cash outflow         31,898,218   4,377,217   15,835,080 26,073,791 9,555,264 
Illicit cash inflow -45,175,610 -41,486,916 -7,426,114 -1,543,436   -1,164,043   -15,661,616     
 
GDP 112,248,353 145,429,765 166,451,213 208,064,754 169,481,318 367,127,873 408,707,161 457,061,383 508,696,795 546,682,345 486,792,838 
illicit cash flow  (% of GDP) -40.25 -28.53 -4.46 -0.74 18.82 -0.32 1.07 -3.43 3.11 4.77 1.96 
Financial Openness is the FDI Net 
Inflow (% of GDP) 4.44 3.34 3.63 3.94 5.05 1.63 2.15 1.53 1.08 0.81 0.65 
Note: Figures are in Current US$  











Table 6: Low Income (Mali) 
  2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Sources of funds:                       
Debt obtained by public sector  -33,289 -1,494,707 264,561 177,946 17,528 261,407 235,920 281,026 300,053 27,129 223,850 
Net inflow of FDI  160,218 148,196 206,065 266,433 646,609 371,570 556,147 397,865 307,853 144,023 152,941 
Total sources (A) 126,929 -1,346,511 470,626 444,379 664,137 632,977 792,067 678,891 607,906 171,152 376,791 
Uses of funds:                        
Net financial account balance -255,997 2,002,524 -230,039 -665,713 -317,417 -899,719 -319,156 -188,601 -149,332 -484,084   
Foreign reserves 123,000     46,000 482,000 -144,000 79,000 -60,000 -93,000 -427,000   
Total uses (B) -132,997 2,002,524 -230,039 -619,713 164,583 -1,043,719 -240,156 -248,601 -242,332 -911,084 
 
(A) - (B) 259,926 -3,349,035 700,665 1,064,092 499,554 1,676,696 1,032,223 927,492 850,238 1,082,236 376,791 
Illicit cash outflow 259,926   700,665 1,064,092 499,554 1,676,696 1,032,223 927,492 850,238 1,082,236 376,791 
Illicit cash inflow   -3,349,035                   
GDP 6,245,032 6,899,780 8,145,695 9,750,823 10,181,021 10,678,749 12,978,108 12,442,748 12,813,249 14,004,068 12,746,689 
illicit cash flow ( % of GDP) 4.16 -48.54 8.60 10.91 4.91 15.70 7.95 7.45 6.64 7.73 2.96 
Financial Openness is the FDI Net 
Inflow (% of GDP) 2.57 2.15 2.53 2.73 6.35 3.48 4.29 3.20 2.32 1.00 2.10 
Note: Figures are in Current US$ 










Table 7: Low Income (Tanzania) 
  2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Sources of funds:                       
Debt obtained by public sector  -82,206 -3,993,850 728,859 529,884 928,777 960,663 837,593 927,825 1,745,908 799,157 778,906 
Net inflow of FDI  935,521 403,039 581,512 1,383,260 952,630 1,813,200 1,229,361 1,799,646 2,087,261 2,044,550 1,960,582 
Total sources (A) 853,315 -3,590,811 1,310,371 1,913,144 1,881,407 2,773,863 2,066,954 2,727,471 3,833,169 2,843,707 2,739,488 
Uses of funds:                        
Net financial account balance -1,538,871 4,492,158 -464,411 -2,442,792 -1,615,462 -2,690,709 -3,045,104 -3,553,439 -4,513,072 -4,149,741 -3,795,327 
Foreign reserves -252,000     108,000 681,000 378,000 -162,000 292,000 634,000 -283,000 -292,000 
Total uses (B) -1,790,871 4,492,158 -464,411 -2,334,792 -934,462 -2,312,709 -3,207,104 -3,261,439 -3,879,072 -4,432,741 -4,087,327 
(A) - (B) 2,644,186 -8,082,969 1,774,782 4,247,936 2,815,869 5,086,572 5,274,058 5,988,910 7,712,241 7,276,448 6,826,815 
Illicit cash outflow 2,644,186   1,774,782 4,247,936 2,815,869 5,086,572 5,274,058 5,988,910 7,712,241 7,276,448 6,826,815 
Illicit cash inflow   -8,082,969                   
GDP 16,929,977 18,610,460 21,501,741 27,368,386 28,573,777 31,407,909 33,878,632 39,087,748 44,333,456 48,197,218 45,628,247 
illicit cash flow (% of GDP) 15.62 -43.43 8.25 15.52 9.85 16.20 15.57 15.32 17.40 15.10 14.96 
Financial Openness is the FDI Net 
Inflow (% of GDP) 5.53 2.17 2.70 5.05 3.33 5.77 3.63 4.60 4.71 3.47 3.52 
Note: Figures are in Current US$   












Table 8: Summary of Illicit Financial Inflow/Outflow of Sample Countries 






Average % to GDP 
(2005-2015) 
 
Net Illicit Financial Flows 
Average % to GDP 
(2005-2015) 
 
Seychelles High 3,322,280 239,323 28.07 24.70 
Angola Upper middle 50,794,036 104,738,541 17.75 -8.24 
South Africa Upper middle 196,335,868 8,411,293 5.58  5.34 
Cote d'Ivoire Lower Middle 5,453,123 21,744,347 9.65 -5.80 
Nigeria Lower Middle 87,739,570 112,457,735 9.77 -4.36 
Mali Low 8,469,913 3,349,035 11.41  2.59 
Tanzania Low 49,647867 8,082,969 17.02  9.12 
Total  401,762,657 259,023,243   
Note: Figures are in Current US$ 
Absolute illicit financial flows are based on the information in row 14 Tables 1-7 without considering the signs 
Net illicit financial flows considered the (+) and (-) negative signs in row 14 Tables 1-7  
Source: Compiled Authors 
 
 





Table 9: Summary of Illicit Financial Inflow/Outflow and proportion of GDP by Income Group 
Income Group Illicit Outflows (% of total US$) Illicit inflows (% of  total US$) Absolute Illicit outflows (% of GDP) 
High  1   28.07 
Upper Middle  62 44 23.33 
Lower Middle 23 52 19.42 
Low 14 4 28.43 
Total 100 100   


















                                                                            
 













                                              
 
 
                                      Chart 2: Proportion of financial inflows by country (2000-2015)
